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Summary. As complex networks in economics, we consider Japanese share-
holding networks as they existed in 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2002, and 2003. In
this study, we use as data lists of shareholders for companies listed on the stock
market or on the over-the-counter market. The lengths of the shareholder lists
vary with the companies, and we use lists for the top 20 shareholders. We rep-
resent these shareholding networks as a directed graph by drawing arrows from
shareholders to stock corporations. Consequently, the distribution of incoming
edges has an upper bound, while that of outgoing edges has no bound. This
representation shows that for all years the distributions of outgoing degrees
can be well explained by the power law function with an exponential tail. The
exponent depends on the year and the country, while the power law shape is
maintained universally. We show that the exponent strongly correlates with
the long-term shareholding rate and the cross-shareholding rate.
Keywords. Shareholding network, Power law, Long-term shareholding, Cross-
shareholding
1 Introduction
Recently, many studies have revealed the true structure of real-world networks
[1, 3]. This development also holds true in the field of econophysics. Such
studies have investigated business networks [9], shareholding networks [10,
11, 12, 5], world trade networks [6, 7], and corporate board networks [2, 4].
By common practice, if we intend to discuss networks, we must define their
nodes and edges. Edges represent the relationships between nodes. The subject
of this study is the ownership network. Accordingly, we consider companies
as nodes and the shareholding relationships between them as edges.
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Table 1. Change in the size of shareholding network N , the total number of edges
K, and the exponent γ of the outgoing degree distribution p(kout) ∝ k
−γ
out
Year 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003
N 2,078 2,466 3,006 3,527 3,727 3,770
K 23,916 29,054 33,860 32,586 30,000 26,407
γ 1.68 1.67 1.72 1.77 1.82 1.86
In this article, we consider Japanese shareholding networks as they existed
in 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2002, and 2003 (see Ref. [5] for shareholding net-
works in MIB, NYSE, and NASDAQ). We use data published by Toyo Keizai
Inc. This data source provides lists of shareholders for companies listed on
the stock market or on the over-the-counter market. The lengths of the share-
holder lists vary with the companies. The data before 2000 contain information
on the top 20 shareholders for each company. On the other hand, the data
for 2002 and 2003 contain information on the top 30 shareholders for each
company. Therefore to uniformly analyze the data we consider the top 20
shareholders for each company.
Types of shareholders include listed companies, non-listed financial insti-
tutions (commercial banks, trust banks, and insurance companies), officers,
and other individuals. In this article, we don’t consider officers and other in-
dividuals, so the shareholding networks are constructed only from companies.
The number of nodes, N , and the total number of edges, K, vary with the
years, and these are summarized in Table. 1.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we consider the degree dis-
tribution for outgoing edges and show that the outgoing degree distribution
follows a power law function with an exponential cutoff. In addition, we show
that the exponent depends on the year and the country, while the power law
shape is maintained universally. We also discuss correlations between the ex-
ponent and the long-term shareholding rate and the cross-shareholding rate.
From this examination, we show that the exponent strongly correlates with
these quantities. The last section is devoted to a summary and discussion.
2 Change of outgoing degree distribution
If we draw arrows from shareholders to stock corporations, we can represent
a shareholding network as a directed graph. If we count the number of in-
coming edges and that of outgoing edges for each node, we can obtain the
degree distribution for incoming degree, kin, and that for outgoing degree,
kout. However, as explained in Sec. 1, the lengths of the shareholder lists vary
with the companies, and thus we consider only the top 20 shareholders for
consistency. Therefore, the incoming degree has an upper bound, kin ≤ 20,
while the outgoing degree has no bound.
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Fig. 1. Log-log plot (left) and semi-log plot (right) of the cumulative probability
distribution, P (kout ≤), of the outgoing degree kout.
The log-log plot of kout is shown in the left panel of Fig. 1. In this fig-
ure, the horizontal axis corresponds to kout, and the vertical axis corresponds
to the cumulative probability distribution P (kout ≤) that is defined by the
probability distribution function p(kout),
P (kout ≤) =
∫
∞
kout
dk′out p(k
′
out),
in the continuous case. We can see that the distribution follows the power law
function, p(kout) ∝ k
−γ
out
, except for the tail part. The exponent γ depends
on the year, as summarized in Table. 1. It has also been reported that the
degree distributions of shareholding networks for companies listed on the Ital-
ian stock market (Milano Italia Borsa; MIB), the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), and the National Association of Security Dealers Automated Quo-
tations (NASDAQ) each follow the power law distribution [5]. The exponents
are γMIB = 1.97 in 2002, γNYSE = 1.37 in 2000, and γNASDAQ = 1.22 in 2000.
These are not so different from the Japanese case.
The semi-log plot is shown in the right panel of Fig. 1, and the meaning
of the axes is the same as in the left panel. We can see that the tail part of
the distribution follows approximately the exponential function. The exponen-
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Fig. 2. Change in the long-term shareholding rate and that in the cross-shareholding
rate (left), and the correlations between these rates and the exponent γ (right).
tial part of the distribution is mainly constructed from financial institutions.
On the other hand, almost all of the power law part of the distribution is
constructed from non-financial institutions. The above results suggest that
different mechanisms work in each range of the distribution, and some of the
reasons for the emergence of this distribution are discussed in Ref. [12].
It is reasonable to assume that the change in the exponent γ can be at-
tributed to the change in the pattern of shareholding. In Japan, since 1987, a
long-term shareholding rate and a cross-shareholding rate have been reported
by Nippon Life Insurance (NLI) Research Institute [8].
The changes in these rates are shown in the left panel of Fig. 2. In this
figure, the horizontal axis corresponds to the year, and the vertical axis corre-
sponds to the shareholding rate calculated on the basis of number of shares.
The open circles corresponds to long-term shareholding, and the open squares
corresponds to cross-shareholding. We can see that both the long-term share-
holding rate and the cross-shareholding rate decrease after 1990.
Correlations of the exponent with the long-term shareholding rate and
with the cross-shareholding rate are shown in the right panel of Fig. 2. In this
figure, the horizontal axis corresponds to the exponent γ, and the vertical
axis, the open circle, and the open square are the same as in the left panel.
We can see that the exponent has strong and negative correlations with both
the long-term shareholding rate and the cross-shareholding rate.
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3 Summary
In this article, we considered Japanese shareholding networks as they existed
in 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2002, and 2003. These networks were represented as
a directed graph by drawing arrows from shareholders to stock corporations.
For these directed shareholding networks, it was shown that the outgoing
degree distribution for each year can be well explained by the power law
distribution, except for the tail part. The exponent depends on the year and
the country, while the power law shape is maintained universally. We also
showed that the exponent has strong and negative correlation with both the
long-term shareholding rate and the cross-shareholding rate. This means that
the dissolution of long-term shareholding and cross-shareholding causes the
exponent to increase.
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